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CAROL WEISBROD*

Comment on Friedman Paper
Professor Friedman's paper deals with certain aspects of American family law, focusing on changes over time in the law governing
divorce. Professor Friedman uses this complex and interesting material to raise fundamental questions concerning the relationships
between legal and social change. In this body of law particularly,
Professor Friedman indicates, one may see goals that go beyond
economic questions to social, religious, and moral issues.
It seems to me that my role as commentator on this rich and
suggestive paper is best fulfilled by focusing on one point. Thus,
this Comment suggests that if we wish to pose questions concerning
the legitimating functions of law and to explore the law of the family in relation to religious and moral ideas, we may want to look
beyond the law of divorce itself and examine other parts of the law
that also protect marriage and the family. We can, perhaps, better
appreciate what was at stake in any particular legal change if we
have a sense of what thile larger contemporaneous legal universe
looked like.
The period that Professor Friedman describes as the "middle period" of divorce law may serve illustratively. Professor Friedman
suggests that we may usefully view the divorce law of this period as
one that evidences a conflict and compromise between the "instrumental demand for divorce and the opposing moral postulate." The
historical question that Professor Friedman raises concerns the precise nature of the compromise. How much contemporaneous, related law should we look at when we consider this problem? Some
examples from the middle period may be useful.
In the state of New York, it is often noted, adultery was the basis
for divorce. Yet adultery was not a crime for many years, and New
York had, as Professor Friedman comments, a highly developed
law of annulment. In the state of South Carolina, which rejected
divorce altogether for a good part of its history, we find a statute
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regulating property left to a concubine. Whatever statement we
make about morality and law in New York or in South Carolina
based only on the law of divorce will presumably be modified when
we broaden our scope of inquiry to include other pieces of the legal
system.
The campaign against Mormon polygamy raises similar questions. Certainly, the movement against polygamy was a significant
expression of traditional values relating to the family. But we gain a
somewhat different perspective on this issue when we view the Mormon controversy against the background of the shift from legislative to judicial divorce and a rising divorce rate (serial polygamy),
and not solely as a conflict between polygamy and monogamy. The
problem raised here does not centrally relate to possible gaps between theory and practice. The point is that the law viewed broadly
may contain enough. data to support a multitude of theories.
That something has changed in the law of marriage is beyond
question. One can reach some of these changes quickly by comparing nineteenth and twentieth century legal responses to the definition of marriage ("the voluntary union for life of one man and one
woman to the exclusion of all others") offered by Lord Penzance in
1866. What, for example, remains of the "for life" component of
the Hyde' definition? The question is what the changes mean and
how they reflect and shape the social situation. And here Professor
Friedman, in outlining various roles that law can play, suggests valuable lines of inquiry. Professor Friedman concludes his paper with
speculations concerning the breakdown of an older, religiouslybased consensus and the replacement of that consensus by "a pluralistic normative system."
This perspective, which relates
problems in the law of marriage and the family to questions often
treated under the heading "civil religion," seems to me to be of considerable importance. The issue is one that we might usefully keep
in mind as we develop our "rainbow of explanations" for legal
change.
I Hyde

v. Hyde, 1 L.R.-P.&D. 130, 133 (1866).

